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The Impact of Liberalizing Labor Mobility in 
the Pacific Region 
 
Terrie L. Walmsley 
S. Amer Ahmed  
and Christopher R. Parsons 
 
Abstract 
Due to the lack of political consensus at the previous General Agreement on Trade on Services 
(GATS), negotiations on the temporary movement of natural persons (Mode 4) have stagnated. 
The growth in the economic literature surrounding this issue has also been lackluster; despite the 
large welfare gains that have been demonstrated to result from relatively small multilateral 
liberalizations on such transitory movements. This paper implements a CGE model of bilateral 
migration flows to quantify the benefits of liberalising GATS Mode 4 in the Pacific region. The 
results indicate that an increase in the labor forces of Australia and New Zealand from elsewhere 
within the Pacific region would raise welfare in both Australia and New Zealand. However the 
results show that while the Pacific Islands economies could gain substantially from the movement 
of unskilled workers, the loss of scarce skilled workers could lead to significant declines in the 
welfare of those remaining. Agreements regarding the movement of unskilled labor could 
therefore potentially constitute significant development policies which warrant further attention 
from policy makers. 
Keywords: Applied general equilibrium modelling, Pacific, GATS Mode 4, labor mobility, skill, 
welfare. 
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The Impact of Liberalizing Labor Mobility in the Pacific Region 
 
1. Introduction 
The WTO’s Uruguay round heralded a new wave of optimism for developing country members 
as the first discussions on the ‘temporary presence of natural persons (Mode 4)’ got underway on 
the General Agreement on Trade on Services (GATS). Developing countries, against a backdrop 
of years of capital and goods market liberalisation, have hoped to capitalise on their abundant 
labour, but reticent policy makers on both sides of the GATS Mode 4 negotiations have remained 
defensive. Little progress has been made in spite of the fact that the welfare benefits from the 
future services liberalisation likely far outstrip the returns from additional goods market 
liberalisation (Hertel et al (2004)).  
Back-of-the-envelope calculations, based on rolling temporary labour schemes, estimate global 
welfare gains from relatively small liberalisations, of between $200bn (Rodrik, 2004) and $300bn 
Winters (2001). More systematic approaches based on various modelling scenarios corroborate 
these computations. Walmsley and Winters (forthcoming) find that a 3% liberalisation on the 
quotas of both the skilled and unskilled from developing to developed nations would yield a 
global welfare gain of $150bn. Simulations from subsequent models based on bilateral migration 
flows (as opposed to from a global migrant pool) show that a similar lifting of quotas would 
produce approximately double these gains (Walmsley, Winters, Parsons and Ahmed, 2005 and 
van der Mensbrugghe, 2005).  Indeed if these estimates be given with certainty they would 
certainly represent lower bound estimates since they fail to account for any dynamic effects, those 
associated with ‘brain circulation’, or the spill over and indirect effects of increased service 
provision (Winters 2003).  
This paper implements a model of bilateral migration flows (GMig2, Walmsley, Winters, 
Parsons, Ahmed, 2005) to assess comparable scenarios to those previously tested, in the context 
of the Pacific region. The remainder of this section provides a brief background to the region. The 
following section gives a brief synopsis of the model and database. Section 3 analyses the results 
and provides a sensitivity analysis and while it is beyond the scope of the paper to discuss in 
detail relevant policy options some are alluded to in passing and conclusions drawn, in the final 
section. 
Australia and New Zealand represent two of the ‘big four’ traditional magnets of international 
immigration alongside Canada and the United States; and both have experienced fairly prolonged 
and sustained economic growth, largely unfettered by the constraints that have hampered the 
development of their Pacific neighbours. Not only are the Pacific islands geographically remote 
they too remain on the periphery of the world economy, increasingly dependent on the wider 
world; the highest recipients of overseas aid on a per capita basis. Narrow production bases, 
declining terms of trade, failures to diversify, significant diseconomies of scale (due to incredibly 
small domestic markets4), and an inability to compete effectively in the global marketplace, have 
resulted in large trade deficits. Increasingly vulnerable, the Pacific Islanders remain highly 
susceptible to external shocks.  
The countries and territories of the Pacific territories have experienced significant migration, with 
large internal movements toward urban conurbations, simultaneously accompanied by 
international emigration. Traditionally high fertility rates, coupled with rising life expectancy, 
                                                          
4 All the Pacific nations are below the richest 150 countries in the world as measured by GDP with the 
exception of PNG (126). 
 4
have resulted in relatively high population growth rates. International migration from the 
territories of the Pacific is viewed in part as a means of relieving population pressure on the 
already scarce resources whilst increasing both the earning potential of the migrant abroad, 
through higher salaries, and the income of the sending family, through remittances. Migration is 
primarily driven by the large disparities in the social and economic factors between the sending 
and host nations. Prospects of superior health standards, better education and higher wages 
stimulate the ever increasing expectations of living standards which fuel the spiralling aspirations 
of moving abroad (Connell, 2003). Migration in the region should be viewed neither as merely a 
response to ailing economies nor simply a development strategy, but more as an intrinsic part of 
life that many islanders take almost for granted. This is perhaps best demonstrated by the 
increasing reliance on remittance flows, particularly in Polynesia, here remittances constitute 7% 
and 41% of annual GDP in Tonga and Samoa respectively 
Australia and New Zealand attract approximately 40% of all Pacific Island migrants (Parsons et al 
2005) and these constitute 4.6% of their (2001) populations, 2.4% of Australia’s and 16.9% of 
New Zealand’s. The number of Islanders abroad relative to those at home is startling, with an 
equivalent 96.9% of the Cook Islanders population living in New Zealand in 2001, with Samoans 
(33.7%), Tongans (24.7%), Tuvaluan (10.1%) and Nauruan (5.7%). Having once flooded into 
New Zealand in the post-war drive to recruit unskilled and medium skilled workers, the numbers 
of Pacific Islanders has dramatically fallen over the medium term though. The introduction of the 
points system in 1991 on the one hand, combined with a falling demand for lower skilled workers 
on the other, has skewed immigrant arrivals away from the more traditional sending region of the 
Pacific, toward other Pacific Rim nations. Australia largely reflects the patterns observed in New 
Zealand; although on a larger scale, involving more migrants from a greater number of source 
countries. The existing immigrant populations together with future flows will represent a 
significant proportion of the total number of Pacific islanders. The reliance of Pacific 
Communities on sending nationals abroad is going to continue, and though their future remains 
far from certain, any future reductions in migration barriers could represent a significant 
development policy for them. 
GATS Mode 4 is not migration and though commonly treated as synonymous to temporary 
migration is rather a temporary movement. As such, many of the arguments commonly cited 
against migration including the erosion of cultural traditions, excessive drains on the public purse 
and anxieties relating to assimilation, are simply not relevant in the case of GATS Mode 4 
(Winters, 2003). Winters identifies within GATS Mode 4, three types of (North-South) flows; the 
movements of the skilled from developed to developing countries, the flows of skilled workers 
from developing to developed nations, and the flows of the unskilled, from developing to 
developed countries. Some headway has been made in the former, in the area of ‘commercial 
presence abroad’, with ‘intra-corporate transferees’. As the Pacific Islands have little or no 
‘commercial presence abroad’ it is of little use to them however. Iredale (2000) notes the great 
reluctance for Pacific communities to either send or receive skilled labour, an unwillingness 
exacerbated by fears of the brain drain. The outflow of skilled workers does tend to both widen 
wage gaps and lower average levels of skill, reducing outputs and already dwindling tax bases5. 
In the Pacific region such movements of the educational elite have left many remaining stocks of 
skilled works severely depleted. In the decade between 1966 and 1976, half of the total number of 
residents in the Cook Islands that possessed any vocational qualification emigrated (Cook Islands, 
1984). Echoing this crisis, approximately 75% of all administrative and managerial workers and 
25% of all professional and technical workers left Fiji between 1987 and 1995 (APMRN, 1997). 
Due to low domestic demand and insufficient capacities to train large numbers of skilled workers, 
                                                          
5 In the case of GATS mode 4 these ‘brain drain’ arguments may not be appropriate since (at least 
theoretically) workers return home 
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island communities find replacing skilled labour extremely problematic. In Fiji for example the 
cost of hiring a foreign worker are between double and quadruple that of a domestic worker 
(APMRN, 1997). Moreover island communities are often hit harder by the loss of this labour, a 
doctor emigrating from a rural area can represent a substantial loss of the local skilled labour 
force for instance. This leads in many cases to a critical weakening of service provision in rural 
areas.  The consequences of the ‘brain drain’ remain far from certain. It is quite plausible that 
workers abroad increase their productivity to such an extent that when they return this more than 
compensates for their loss, the so-called ‘beneficial brain drain’ (Winters, 2003). The increased 
return to education through temporary movement also warrants attention (Commander, 
Kangesniemi and Winters 2002). Acquiring skills is likely to remain a high priority for many. 
Kiribati and Tuvalu stand out as examples of nations not just in the Pacific but in the world that 
specifically train people to work abroad.  
These potential gains in the context of the Pacific are unlikely to be realised. If the domestic pool 
of skilled workers dwindles sufficiently, then even if migrants return with vastly superior 
productivity, net gains are improbable. If the country has had to endure an extended period when 
they are few, or virtually no skilled workers, a ‘transitory brain drain’, a worsening of living 
standards, and of both the quality of education, and health care, together with dramatic reductions 
in wages and output. Certainly in some occupations there is simply no substitute for unskilled 
labour. For the Pacific communities this is the resource in which they possess a comparative 
advantage and relatively large endowments, and therefore an area in which they seek greater 
openness and better market access. This is where the differences, the fundamental basis on which 
trade generates net gains are greatest, and where the successful exploitation of these differences 
will yield the largest welfare benefits. As in most developed nations both Australia and New 
Zealand have an increasingly educated and more highly skilled though aging population. Over 
time therefore the scarcity of unskilled labour will likely increase; although this is not presently 
the case as unemployment among the domestic unskilled remains. Nevertheless it is (almost) 
inevitable that in the coming decades opportunities will arise for the Pacific communities to send 
more unskilled workers abroad. This would go some way to redress the skill imbalance in all of 
these economies and provide a source for additional future remittance earnings. The existence of 
bilateral agreements is surely the biggest hurdle standing in the way of future liberalisation of 
GATS Mode 4. However, with a greater number of stakeholders actively contributing to the 
present round of negotiations, optimism must remain. 
2. Model and Data 
GATS Mode 4 can be modeled at either extreme from which it can be viewed, i.e. from a 
perspective of pure labor migration or analogous to greater trade in goods.  Here we choose to 
model with an increase in the population.   
We use a standard global applied general equilibrium model (GTAP, Hertel, 1997) which has 
been adjusted to take into account bilateral labor flows.  The model, termed GMig2, is similar to 
the model used in Walmsley and Winters (forthcoming).  In that model, Walmsley and Winters 
(forthcoming) hypothesized a global pool to intermediate the flow of labor between countries, 
which circumvented the problem of the lack of bilateral data on the stocks of migrants. In this 
model, bilateral labor flows are modelled directly and therefore data is an important aspect of this 
model. The benefit of this approach is that we have bilateral data which allows us to track the 
bilateral flows of labor, their productivities and their remittances directly.  
The data base used with the Bilateral Labor Migration Model (GMig2, Walmsley, Winters, 
Parsons and Ahmed, 2005) is based on the GTAP 6 Data Base (Dimaranan and McDougall, 
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2005) and is augmented with the bilateral migration data base developed by Parsons, Skeldon, 
Winters and Walmsley (2005) and remittance data from the World Bank (Ratha, 2003).  These 
data were used to estimate bilateral wages and remittances in the model6 (Walmsley et al, 2005). 
A number of assumptions are made in creating this data base and in the model itself, which are 
outlined here7 and provided in greater detail in Walmsley et al (2005).  We assume: 
• migrant’s participation rates are the same as in their home region; 
• labor has the same characteristics as their home region, in terms of skilled/unskilled 
labor splits; 
• wages of migrants (Wi,r,c) are equal to the home wage (HWi,r) plus a proportion 
(beta) of the difference between host and home wage (HWi,c - HWi,r): 
Wi,r,c = HWi,r + BETA x (HWi,c - HWi,r) 
Where: BETA is the proportion of the difference obtained by a person of labor type i 
migrating from region r to region c (= 0.75); 
• a constant remittance to income ratio to determine bilateral remittances in the data 
base (in the model we assume that remittances remain a constant proportion of 
income); 
• all other income (from capital, land etc) accrues to permanent residents; 
• that foreign and domestic labor are perfect substitutes;  
• the quantity of skilled and unskilled labor within a region is fixed and only changes 
with the movement of capital from one region to another;  
• that there is excess demand for the quota spaces and hence any change in quotas will 
be filled by the labor exporting region;  
• that tax is paid by both foreign and domestic residents;  
• that incomes earned by both domestic and foreign residents are aggregated and 
allocated across consumption, government and saving; and 
• a revolving door, where temporary workers continually enter and return to their home 
countries. Unless otherwise stated, no changes in productivities are assumed upon 
their return home8.   
In addition to the above assumptions, the authors would also like to emphasize caution when 
using these results. While the countries shown separately in the GTAP Data Base are based on 
input-output tables collected from numerous sources, the Rest of Oceania is a region which has 
been constructed from the input-output tables of other regions and hence problematic.9  For this 
reason we concentrate on the macroeconomic results. 
                                                          
6 Further information on the methods used to create this data base and model are available from the Walmsley et al. 
(2005). 
7 Further work is still being undertaken on the GMig2 model and data base to get better data on many of these aspects 
and /or test their importance.   
8 This assumption may be unrealistic given that many temporary labor schemes are designed to increase skill levels 
and/or productivity. 
9 The rest of Oceania is a ‘composite region’; that is it is made up of a number of countries and hence is not based on 
the Input-Output tables of the countries within the rest of Oceania. To obtain data for the rest of Oceania, each country 
 7
These results are the comparative static short run impacts of these policies. That is, they show 
how much better (or worse) off the residents of each region are in the short run, before capital has 
had time to respond to changes in the rates of return. 
Charts 5 and 6 show the shares of foreign labor in Australia and New Zealand respectively, 
contained in the data base. Both charts show that Europe is the largest provider of foreign labor to 
both Australia and New Zealand. New Zealand is also a large supplier of foreign labor to 
Australia, primarily due to their geographical proximity and ties through the Closer Economic 
Relations agreement. South East Asia and the rest of the world are also large suppliers of labor.  
As mentioned above the Pacific Islands are not an important source of foreign labor for Australia, 
in New Zealand however, the Pacific Islands represent the second largest source of foreign 
workers, followed by Australia and the rest of the world. 













                                                                                                                                                                             
in the rest of Oceania is assigned a proxy input-output table which is based on a country of similar structure for which 
an input-output table is available. Next the proxy table is scaled to match the macro and trade data for that country.  
The resulting input-output tables of all of the countries in the rest of Oceania are then aggregated into one table for the 
Rest of Oceania. The rest of Oceania is made up American Samoa, Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, 
Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Federated States of, Nauru, New Caledonia, Norfolk Island, Northern Mariana 
Islands, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Wallis and 
Futuna. Unfortunately no input-output tables for countries in the rest of Oceania have been contributed to the GTAP 
Data Base and hence the regional data for the rest of Oceania is unlikely to accurately reflect the structure of those 
economies.   
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The purpose of this paper is primarily to examine how increases in the flows of temporary labor 
to Australia and New Zealand from the Pacific Islands would affect Australia, New Zealand and 
the Pacific Islands. Quotas on Australia and New Zealand’s temporary movement of natural 
persons were increased by 1% of the labor forces and these increased quotas were filled by labor 
from the Pacific Islands.   
Table 1 shows the stock of Pacific Island migrants in Australia and New Zealand prior to the 
shock and after the quotas have been increased by 1 and 3% respectively.  There are currently 
only about 111 thousand migrant workers from the Pacific Islands in Australia and New Zealand. 
As mentioned above in terms of numbers Australia and New Zealand have similar numbers of 
migrants from the Pacific Islands, however as a percentage of the labor force, New Zealand is an 
important importer of Pacific Island labor. After the 1% increase in migrant labor quotas from the 
Pacific Islands, this number doubles to 232 thousand. This increase of 1% in the Australian and 
New Zealand labor force amounts to declines in the Pacific Island’s skilled and unskilled workers 
of 21% and 2% respectively10. While the Pacific Islands could afford to send 2% of their 
unskilled labor force, a loss of 21% of their skilled labor force is likely to have a significant 
negative effect. However, such declines in the skilled labor force of the Pacific Islands have been 
experienced in the past. Two examples were given above, the case of the Cook Islands where in 
the decade between 1966 and 1976 half of the total number of residents possessing any vocational 
qualification emigrated (Cook Islands, 1984); and in Fiji between 1987 and 1995 where 
approximately 75% of administrative and managerial workers and 25% of all professional and 
technical workers left (APMRN, 1997). 
 
Table 1: Stock of Pacific Island Migrants by skill in Australia and New Zealand 
(Numbers of people)  
 Skilled Unskilled Total 
 Australia  New Zealand Australia New Zealand Australia  
New 
Zealand 
Initial 2350 2773 48946 57739 51296 60512 
1% 41201 8966 111096 71546 152297 80512 
3% 118903* 21352* 235396 99160 354299 120512 
* The skilled labor forces in Australia and New Zealand were not increased by 3% since this would have significantly 
reduced the skilled labor force in the Pacific Islands.  
The results were compared with those when quotas were filled by alternative labor exporting 
counties, including developing economies, developed economies and those of South East Asia. 
Under these assumptions the increased quotas are supplied according to the labor force shares, 
hence the extent to which Pacific Islanders fill these places diminishes significantly as labor is 
sourced from more countries, particularly in Australia. 
Further sensitivity analysis was conducted to examine the impact of varying the magnitude of the 
increase in quotas. Specifically, the 1% increase in unskilled labor was compared with the case 
where the unskilled labor force was increased by 3%. A 3% increase in the quotas of Australia 
                                                          
10 The reason for this large difference is that while the Pacific Island’s has a reasonably large population of 
approximately 7m only 5% of its labor force is skilled as compared to approximately 30% of Australia and New 
Zealand’s labor forces.  Hence skilled labor is a very scarce resource in the Pacific Island economies.   
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and New Zealand leads to over 335 thousand unskilled migrants from the Pacific Island 
economies. This amounted to 8.7% of the Pacific Island economies unskilled labor force. We also 
examine smaller increases in the flow of skilled workers between the Pacific Islands and 
Australia/New Zealand. 
Migrants often return with increased skills and knowledge to their home countries. Moreover, 
some temporary migration schemes also assist with capacity building efforts in the labor 
exporting economy. We therefore also conduct an experiment to investigate the impact of an 
increase in the productivities of returning workers.  
4. Results 
In this section we examine the results of the alternative experiments outlined above. In the first 
section we examine the macro implications and hence the impact on welfare, in section b) the 
sectoral implications. Section c) compares the results with those obtained when the labor forces 
are increased by 3% in Australia and New Zealand.  In section d) we compare the results with the 
case where other economies supply the increased quotas: South East Asia, developing and 
developed economies.  
4.1 Macroeconomic Effects 
The welfare changes of labor from country r residing in country s are displayed in Tables 2A to 
2C. As a consequence of the increased flow of skilled and unskilled migrant workers from the 
Pacific Islands into Australia and New Zealand, the welfare of Australians and New Zealanders 
residing in Australia and New Zealand rises by 302.61m and 26.5m respectively (Table 2A). This 
is due to the fact that the increased labor endowment in Australia and New Zealand has increased 
the returns to capital (Table 3 and 4) and tax revenues, which offsets the fall in wages. Most of 
the gains come from the increase in quotas on unskilled labor (Table 2B and 2C). Tables 2B and 
2C decompose the total according to skilled and unskilled movement of labor.     
Existing foreign workers in Australia and New Zealand, including those from the Pacific Islands, 
lose (Table 2A) as these wages fall (Table 3 and 4). Since foreign workers are temporary, they do 
not own capital and therefore the rise in returns to capital does not compensate for the loss in 
labor income. Foreign workers from the EU lose the most due to the large proportion of workers 
already located in Australia in the initial data base (42% of migrants in Australia are from the 
EU) and New Zealand (37% of migrants are from the EU)11. 
                                                          
11 Note that when only the quotas on skilled labor (Table 2C) are increased, the welfare of some foreign workers in 
Australia and New Zealand rises (e.g. Chinese workers in Australia, Table 2C, experience an increase in welfare of 
1.3m). This is due to the fact that China supplies mostly unskilled labor to Australia and New Zealand.  The increase in 
quotas on skilled workers causes the wage of unskilled to rise and hence the gains to existing unskilled Chinese 
workers living in Australia and New Zealand are greater than the losses made by existing skilled Chinese workers as 
their wages decline. 
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Table 2A: Bilateral Welfare Changes for 1% Shock to Unskilled and Skilled Labor 
(Millions of US$) 
 Host Region12  
Home Region13 Australia New Zealand 
Pacific 
Islands Other
14 Total welfare of home region 
Australia 302.61 -0.85 1.77 0.00 303.53
New Zealand -6.88 26.55 0.94 0.00 20.61
Pacific Islands 1386.10 168.07 -488.02 0.00 1066.14
China -2.89 -0.63 0.50 1.70 -1.32
South Asia -1.40 -0.18 0.03 -4.12 -5.67
North America -2.55 -0.66 16.49 -4.02 9.26
EU 15 -44.08 -7.14 5.05 -12.66 -58.83
South East Asia -8.23 -0.61 3.87 0.70 -4.28
Rest of East Asia -3.99 -1.13 2.53 -11.16 -13.76
North Africa & Middle East -1.12 -0.10 0.15 0.82 -0.25
Eastern Europe & Former 
Soviet Union -4.92 -0.20 3.73 -1.74 -3.13
ROW -6.35 -0.65 0.77 -2.62 -8.85
Total welfare of host region 1606.28 182.46 -452.19 -33.10 1303.44
 
Table 2B   Bilateral Welfare Changes for 1% Shock to Unskilled Labor  
(Millions of US$) 
 Host Region  
Home Region Australia New Zealand 
Pacific 
Islands Other 
Total Welfare of 
Home Region 
Australia 199.84 -0.38 0.07 0.00 199.53 
New Zealand -4.88 17.90 0.04 0.00 13.07 
Pacific Islands 775.05 104.13 22.03 0.00 901.21 
China -4.20 -0.76 0.10 0.96 -3.90 
South Asia -1.95 -0.21 0.01 -3.78 -5.94 
North America -1.52 -0.35 0.97 -3.92 -4.82 
EU 15 -24.86 -3.36 0.26 -6.50 -34.46 
South East Asia -9.47 -0.57 0.13 0.19 -9.73 
Rest of East Asia -3.98 -0.91 0.22 -3.83 -8.51 
North Africa & Middle East -1.44 -0.11 0.01 0.67 -0.86 
Eastern Europe and Former 
Soviet Union -4.19 -0.15 0.12 -1.02 -5.24 
ROW -7.01 -0.55 0.06 -1.82 -9.33 
Total welfare of host region 911.39 114.67 24.02 -19.06 1031.02 
                                                          
12 Host region is the region where the person is currently residing either temporarily or permanently.  Hence the host 
region of an Australian who lives in the United Kingdom is the United Kingdom. 
13 Home region is the region where people are permanent residents or in this database the region of birth.  Hence the 
home region of an Australian who lives in the United Kingdom is Australia.  Hence $1386.10m is the welfare gained 
by Pacific Islander’s living in Australia from the increase in Australia and New Zealand’s quotas equal to 1% of their 
labor force and supplied by workers from the Pacific Islands only. This positive value reflects the increase in numbers 
of Pacific Islander’s in Australia earning the Australian wage. On the other hand, $4.88m is the welfare loss of New 
Zealander’s currently living in Australia when Australia and New Zealand increase their quotas, and these quotas are 
supplied by workers from the Pacific Islands.  This negative reflects the fall in wages which these existing workers will 
endure (note there is no change in the number of New Zealand workers in Australia, as New Zealand does not supply 
more labor to Australia as a result of the change in quotas).   
14 Other contains all other regions except Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands.  Welfare changes are simply 
aggregated.  There is no change in the labor force of these regions as a result of the experiment. 
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Table 2C   Bilateral Welfare Changes for 1% Shock to Skilled Labor  
(Millions of US$) 
 Host Region  
Home Region Australia New Zealand 
Pacific 
Islands Other 
Total Welfare of 
Home Region 
Australia 102.77 -0.47 1.70 0.00 103.99 
New Zealand -2.00 8.64 0.90 0.00 7.54 
Pacific Islands 611.05 63.94 -510.06 0.00 164.93 
China 1.30 0.13 0.40 0.73 2.57 
S. Asia 0.55 0.03 0.02 -0.33 0.27 
N. America -1.04 -0.32 15.52 -0.10 14.07 
EU 15 -19.23 -3.77 4.79 -6.16 -24.37 
S. East Asia 1.24 -0.04 3.74 0.51 5.46 
Rest of E. Asia -0.01 -0.22 2.32 -7.33 -5.24 
N. Africa & Middle East 0.32 0.01 0.14 0.16 0.62 
E. Europe & Former Soviet 
Union -0.74 -0.05 3.60 -0.71 2.10 
ROW 0.66 -0.10 0.71 -0.80 0.48 
Total welfare of host region 694.88 67.79 -476.21 -14.04 272.42 
 
Table 3   Percentage Changes In Real Factor Returns And Real GDP Due To 
Unskilled Labor 
I II III IV V  VI 
Regions 
% Change in 
Real Wage of 
Skilled Labor 
% Change in 
Real Wage of 
Unskilled Labor 







in Terms of 
Trade 
Australia 0.20 -0.41 0.23 0.27 -0.01 
New Zealand 0.18 -0.44 0.21 0.26 -0.03 
Pacific Islands -0.01 1.26 -0.23 -0.52 0.36 
China 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
S. Asia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N. America 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
EU 15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
S. East Asia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Rest of East Asia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N. Africa & Middle East 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Eastern Europe & Former 
Soviet Union 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 




Table 4: Percentage Changes in Real Factor Returns and Real GDP Due to Skilled 
Labor 
I II III IV V  VI 
Regions 
% change in 
Real Wage of 
Skilled Labor
% change in 
Real Wage of 
Unskilled Labor
% Change in 
Rental Price 
of Capital 





Australia -0.56 0.13 0.17 0.21 -0.02 
New Zealand -0.65 0.09 0.11 0.16 -0.02 
Pacific Islands 18.69 -1.93 -2.57 -4.00 0.65 
China 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
South Asia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
North America 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
EU 15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
South East Asia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Rest of East Asia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
North Africa & Middle East 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Eastern Europe & Former 
Soviet Union 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ROW 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
The Pacific Islanders located in Australia and New Zealand gain significantly due to the fact that 
they are supplying the increased quotas. The welfare of the permanent residents of the Pacific 
Islands however, falls considerably (-$488m). This loss is the result of the increase in quotas on 
skilled labor which reduces welfare by 510m (Table 2C). This loss from skilled labor is the result 
of a substantial rise (18.7%) in real skilled wages in the Pacific Islands, which is not offset by 
increased remittances sent back home by the skilled temporary workers. The loss of unskilled 
labor actually raises the welfare of permanent residents by 22m (Table 2B). In this case the loss 
of labor is more than offset by their remittances.  
The welfare loss of the Pacific Islands’ permanent residents is dwarfed by the gains enjoyed by 
the migrant labor in Australia and New Zealand, leading to an overall positive change in welfare 
for Pacific Islanders as a whole. However, as indicated above this is done at great expense to 
Pacific Islanders at home. 
Two assumptions made in the model may affect these results. First, returning migrants do not 
experience an increase in productivity as a result of their temporary work abroad.  However 
temporary worker schemes are often linked with capacity building and hence returning migrants 
are expected to experience increased productivities. Table 5 shows the impact of increasing the 
productivity of returning skilled and unskilled labor. The increase in productivity is determined 
by assuming that returning 80% of Pacific Islanders continue to gain 50% of the difference 
between their productivities abroad and at home15.  This leads to a 32% increase in the 
productivity of skilled temporary workers, which is equivalent to a 6% increase in the 
                                                          
15 Remember that a Pacific Islander living in the USA will gain 75% of the difference in productivities between a 
Pacific Islander working at home and an American person working in America.  Hence when they return we assume 
they keep 50% of this difference.  
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productivity of the skilled workforce.  The increase in productivity of unskilled is much larger, 
primarily because wage differentials (on which productivity is assumed) are much larger. The 
increased productivities of skilled and unskilled returning migrants raise the welfare of Pacific 
Islanders. These gains also offset the initial loss of skilled labor and hence overall welfare is 
positive (18.84m).  However most of the gains are from returning unskilled workers with higher 
productivities. The benefits from increased productivity of returning skilled workers do not offset 
the initial loss resulting from more skilled workers temporarily moving abroad16. 
The second assumption is that the quotas are assumed to be filled. It could be argued that an 
increase in the real wages of skilled workers in the Pacific Islanders of 18% might provide a large 
enough incentive to skilled Pacific Islanders that they choose not to move to Australia and New 
Zealand. High levels of previous permanent migration however do not confirm this. There are 
many reasons other than wages which affect a persons decision to migrate, including job 
satisfaction, the quality and amount of public services such as health and education, the 
availability and cost of transport and telecommunication to overcome isolation, etc. 
 
Table 5: Welfare of Pacific Islanders in the Pacific Islands with an Increase in 
Productivity of Returning Migrants   
 Skilled Labor Unskilled Labor   
 Productivity Initial Loss of Labor Productivity 
Initial Loss of 
Labor 
Welfare of Pacific Islanders in the 
Pacific Islands ($US millions) -397.37 416.20 
Decomposed into productivity and 
loss of labor force ($US millions) 124.80 -522.17 395.70 20.51 
Productivity increase of migrantsa 32.01%  627.05%  
Equivalent Productivity increase 
of Labor force 6.27%  9.95%  
a. Assumes 80% of workers return with 50% of gains 
The permanent residents of China and South East Asia gain from increased trading opportunities 
with Australia and New Zealand: while the more skilled labor intensive countries – such as 
Europe, East Asia, and North America – lose. 
Real GDP rises in Australia and New Zealand due to the greater access to labor endowments, 
both skilled and unskilled (columns V, Tables 3 and 4).  The rental price of capital rises reflecting 
the increased demand for capital which accompanies the abundance of skilled and unskilled labor.       
Real GDP in the Pacific Islands falls, particularly with the movement of skilled labor to Australia 
and New Zealand. The scarcity of skilled labor raises the real wage of skilled labor by 18% and 
reduces the returns to capital and hence the rental price also falls significantly (2.57% in Table 4). 
The 1.26% rise in unskilled real wages on the other hand is relatively small and has a much 
smaller impact on the returns to capital and Real GDP. Given that the increased quota amounts to 
only 2% of the Pacific Islands unskilled workforce, this rise in the real wages of unskilled 
                                                          
16 This experiment assumes that the temporary flow of labor is continuous.  As workers move home with higher 
productivities they are immediately replaced with other temporary workers such that the labor supply in the Pacific 
Island’s is permanently lower.  This is the revolving door feature referred to above.   
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workers might not occur at all if the movement of unskilled labor merely reduces the level of 
unemployment in the Pacific Islands. 
Alongside the improvement in the real wages of skilled workers (18%), the Pacific Islands also 
experiences a 1 percent improvement in terms of trade as the price of its exports rises relative to 
imports. This is due to a real exchange rate appreciation resulting from the substantial rise in 
skilled wages.   
4.2  Sectoral Output 
Chart 7 illustrate the effects of the liberalization on the sectoral output of Australia17.  
Output in Australia and New Zealand increases in all sectors, although the magnitude of the 
increases are much smaller than the decreases experienced by the Pacific Islands. Australia gains 
most heavily in the Electronics sector, while New Zealand does best in Manufacturing, Other 
Services, and Capital Goods. Both countries see large improvements in their Textiles sector 
output. Again most of the gains are the result of increases in unskilled labor. 
4.3 Skilled Labor 
As mentioned above an increase in Australia and New Zealand’s skilled labor force of 1% is 
equivalent to a fall in the Pacific island’s skilled labor force of 21%. In this section we examine 
the impact of alternative shocks. Table 6 shows that reducing the quota to an increase of 0.2% of 
the Australian and New Zealand skilled workforce reduces the losses to the Pacific Island 
economies considerably, from $510m under the previous experiment to $93m. The skilled labor 
force in the Pacific Island economies would fall by just over 4%, much less than the previous case 
where 21% of the Pacific Island’s skilled labor force moved. As less skilled labor moves abroad 
the welfare losses diminish considerably.  It is interesting to note that the movement of just 1% of 
the Pacific Island’s skilled labor force would offset all gains made from sending 2% of its 
unskilled labor force.   
                                                          
17 We choose not to display the results for the Pacific Island’s given that the sectoral detail of the Pacific Islands 
underpinning this analysis is unlikely to be accurate. The effects on New Zealand are similar to those on Australia.  The 
effects on the other regions are mostly negative and insignificant. 
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Chart 7  Impact of Increased Unskilled and Skilled Labor Movement on Sectoral 






























4.4   Unskilled Labor 
In the case of unskilled labor the gains to the Pacific Islander’s living in the Pacific Islands 
increases as the quota is further increased to 2% and 3% respectively (Table 7).   Similarly the 
gains to Australia and New Zealand also increase as more unskilled labor is obtained from the 
Pacific Islands.   
Table 7: Sensitivity Analysis: The Impact of Alternative Changes in Unskilled Labor Quotas on 
Welfare 
% increase in Australia and New Zealand’s Unskilled Labor Forces 
(shock) 1% 2% 3% 
% of Pacific Islander's unskilled worker population -1.94% -3.88 -5.82 
Welfare of Pacific Islanders in Pacific Islands (Millions of US$) 22.03 41.46 58.82 
Welfare of Australian’s in Australia  (Millions of US$) 199.84 402.18 605.87 
Welfare of New Zealander’s in New Zealand (Millions of US$) 17.9 36.23 54.88 
 
4.5  Alternative Labor Exporters 
In the following sections we examine the case where Australia and New Zealand increase their 
quotas on the temporary movement of labor, however this new labor is supplied by South East 
Asia (only), South East Asia and the Pacific Islands, all developing countries, and all developed 
countries. 
 4.5.1   Pacific Islands Versus South East Asia 
In this section we examine the welfare implications of expanding quotas by 1% to persons from 
South East Asia and compare this with the case where the quotas are increased for persons from 
Pacific Island economies only and for the case where both South East Asians and Pacific 
Islanders fill the 1% increase in quotas (Table 8). 
In the case where quotas are increased for only South East Asian persons the gains to Australia 
and New Zealand are slightly less than the Pacific Island case (Table 8). The reason for this is 
that the Pacific Islanders send less remittances back home as a proportion of their income than 
South East Asians18. Of course the gains are now obtained by South East Asian labor in Australia 
and New Zealand. The remaining residents of South East Asia also gain as a result of the 
movement of labor.  Almost all of the gains are made from the movement of unskilled labor, 
however unlike the Pacific Islands the loss of skilled labor does not result in an overall decline in 
welfare, but a small positive change.     
In the second case we have assumed that quotas would be opened to both Pacific Island 
economies and South East Asia and these economies would supply the labor in accordance with 
their existing shares. As expected the Pacific Islands supply a larger portion (74.7%) of New 
Zealand’s increased quota for unskilled labor, although in absolute numbers they send more 
                                                          
18 As noted by Freud et al (2005) these remittance rates may be lower due to informal flows.  Increases remittance rates 
would lead to larger transfers from Australia/New Zealand to the Pacific Islands. 
 18
unskilled labor to Australia (11,274).  This unskilled labor represents a small proportion of the 
Pacific Island’s unskilled labor supply (0.55%, Table 8).  In terms of skilled labor the numbers of 
people are relatively small (Table 9) however they represent a reasonable percentage of the 
Pacific Island’s labor supply (2.45%, Table 8).   
In this case the impact on Australia and New Zealand is similar to that in the other cases.  The 
Pacific Island’s lose less from the skilled labor. However, they also lose some of the gains made 
from supplying unskilled labor.  South East Asia on the other hand gains from sending both, more 
so from unskilled labor than skilled. 
Table 8: Comparison of Welfare Results from alternative sources of Labor (Millions of US$) 
 Host Region  
Quotas 













Australia 199.84 -0.38 0.07 0.00 0.00 199.53 
New Zealand -4.88 17.90 0.04 0.00 0.00 13.07 Unskilled 
Pacific Islands 775.05 104.13 22.03 0.00 0.00 901.21 
Australia 102.77 -0.47 1.70 0.00 0.00 103.99 





Pacific Islands 611.05 63.94 -510.06 0.00 0.00 164.93 
Australia 190.67 -0.41 0.00 0.01 0.00 190.28 
New Zealand -5.11 16.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.59 
Pacific Islands -2.55 -2.01 0.22 0.00 0.00 -4.34 
Unskilled 
S. East Asia 693.43 99.11 0.00 147.68 0.01 940.23 
Australia 91.08 -0.44 0.00 0.02 0.00 90.66 
New Zealand -1.98 8.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.39 





S. East Asia 1.24 -0.04 3.74 0.51 5.46 0.00 
Australia 192.08 -0.39 0.02 0.00 0.00 191.72 
New Zealand -5.07 17.62 0.01 0.00 0.00 12.57 
Pacific Islands 138.41 77.26 4.55 0.00 0.00 220.22 
S. East Asia 566.00 24.66 0.04 111.41 0.00 702.10 
Unskilled 
% change in  
labor force 1% 1% -0.55% -0.02%  
Australia 91.55 -0.45 0.16 0.02 0.00 91.28 
New Zealand -1.98 8.97 0.08 0.00 0.00 7.07 
Pacific Islands 37.84 28.74 -52.84 0.00 0.00 13.74 
S. East Asia 483.12 30.00 0.35 26.73 -0.01 540.19 





% change in 
Labor force 1% 1% -2.45% -0.17%  
 
4.5.2 All Developing Countries 
Under this scenario we consider the implications of Australia and New Zealand increasing their 
quotas on skilled and unskilled labor and allowing these quotas to be filled by all developing 
countries.  This scenario represents a North-South liberalization of GATS Mode 4. The 
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developing labor exporting regions comprise the Pacific Islands, China, South Asia, South East 
Asia, North Africa and the Middle East, Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, and the 
Rest of the World. 
Once again looking first at welfare changes in Tables 10A and 10B, it can be seen that Australia 
and New Zealand again experience significant welfare gains, although the sizes of the gains are 
smaller than in the scenario where the increased labor was imported from the Pacific Islands only.  
The gains to the Pacific Islands are reduced as they supply less of the unskilled labor, just 0.25% 
of their labor force as compared to 1.94% when only they filled the quotas.  It is also not 
surprising that they lose considerably less from skilled labor.  
Migrants from South East Asia, the Rest of the World, China and Eastern Europe gain 
considerably as a result of the increased quotas (Tables 10A and B). These are also the countries 
with the highest shares of the unskilled quotas: 30, 20, 11 and 13% respectively of Australia’s 
quotas. While most countries gain more from unskilled labor than from skilled, Eastern Europe 
gains more from the increase in skilled labor quotas (Tables 10A and B); this is due to the fact 
that Eastern Europe supplies almost 30% of the increased skilled labor quota as opposed to only 
13% of the unskilled. 
Most of the remaining residents of the labor exporting countries gain, at least from the increase in 
quotas on unskilled labor (Table 10A). The results are more mixed from skilled labor movement 
(Table 10B).     
4.5.3 All Developed Countries 
The final simulation considers North-North liberalization, where quotas are filled by workers 
from other developed countries. The developed countries in this simulation are considered to be 
roughly the following regions: the EU 15, the Rest of East Asia, and North America19.   
The results from this scenario are shown in Tables 11A and 11B, for unskilled and skilled labor 
respectively. In this scenario the permanent residents of Australia and New Zealand have the 
largest welfare gains of all the simulations. This is due to the fact that the skilled and unskilled 
labor from Europe, North America and the Rest of Asia are also the most productive and hence 
add considerably to the effective labor force.  The wages of the skilled and unskilled in Australia 
and New Zealand also decline the most when labor from developed economies fills the increased 
quotas. 
                                                          
19 Note that movement between Australia and New Zealand is not included because of the CER agreement which 
already allows for the free movement of labor between these countries. 
 
  Table 10A   Welfare Results from Removal of Unskilled Labor, Supplied by Developing Economies (Millions of US$) 
 Host Region 
Home region Australia New Zealand 
Pacific 
Islands China S.Asia 
S. East 
Asia 
N. Africa & 
Middle East 
E. Europe & 
Former Soviet 
Union 
ROW Other Developed 
Australia 186.16 -0.39 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
New Zealand -5.19 16.80 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pacific Islands 48.36 41.77 1.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
China 81.39 16.49 0.01 7.17 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 
S. Asia 38.31 4.65 0.00 0.00 54.39 0.01 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.00 
N. America -1.63 -0.36 0.13 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.05 -1.87 
EU 15 -26.82 -3.46 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.17 -3.36 
South East Asia 198.14 13.35 0.02 0.00 0.00 42.67 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Rest of East Asia -4.17 -0.93 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 2.66 
N. Africa & Middle East 28.96 2.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 33.83 0.00 0.01 0.00 
E. Europe & Former 
Soviet Union 98.41 3.75 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.19 -2.80 0.04 0.01 
ROW 148.83 13.26 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.02 7.03 -0.01 
Total welfare of host 
region 790.76 107.33 2.15 7.18 54.60 42.93 34.42 -2.73 7.35 -2.55 
% of Labor force 1.00 1.00 -0.25 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
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Table 10B  Welfare Results from Removal of Skilled Labor, Supplied by Developing Economies (Millions Of US$) 
 Host Region 







E. Europe & 
Former Soviet 
Union 
ROW Other Developed 
Australia 91.84 -0.45 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
New Zealand -2.00 8.75 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pacific Islands 13.05 12.89 -20.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
China 18.23 3.98 0.01 -3.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
South Asia 12.60 1.53 0.00 0.00 12.79 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
North America -1.03 -0.30 0.57 0.00 0.04 0.12 0.11 0.02 0.24 -1.31 
EU 15 -19.01 -3.59 0.18 0.00 0.12 0.17 0.24 0.14 0.66 -5.63 
South East Asia 161.43 13.25 0.14 0.00 0.01 10.27 0.05 0.00 0.01 -0.01 
Rest of East Asia -0.05 -0.20 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04 -1.94 
N. Africa & Middle East 15.41 1.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 1.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 
E. Europe & Former       
Soviet Union 162.24 6.25 0.13 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.46 -8.90 0.15 0.00 
ROW 137.66 17.60 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.02 -44.22 -0.01 
Total Welfare of Host Region 590.38 61.17 -19.05 -3.35 13.05 10.73 2.90 -8.71 -43.12 -8.90 
% of Labor force 1.00 1.00 -0.96 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 
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Table 11a: Welfare Results from Removal of Unskilled Labor, Supplied by Developed Economies 
(Millions Of US$) 
 Host Region  













Australia 271.73 -0.63 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 271.19 
New 
Zealand -6.77 30.09 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 23.41 
Pacific 
Islands -3.43 -3.21 0.13 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 -6.43 
China -5.81 -1.27 0.00 0.25 0.85 0.59 1.29 -4.12 
S. Asia -2.70 -0.36 0.00 0.10 0.98 0.01 -1.92 -3.89 
N. 
America 50.26 12.66 0.01 -93.27 1.32 0.01 0.00 -29.02 
Europe 846.31 128.73 0.00 0.42 -1307.09 0.00 -0.01 -331.65 
S.East 
Asia -13.13 -0.96 0.00 0.43 1.37 0.06 1.65 -10.58 
Rest of E. 









-5.80 -0.25 0.00 0.27 4.15 0.01 -3.42 -5.04 





1223.46 191.75 0.15 -90.03 -1285.06 -165.70 -4.19 -129.62 
% of Labor 
Force 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 0.00  
 
Migrant labor from Europe gains the most as they supply between 72-92% of the increased 
quotas in Australia and New Zealand. The remaining residents in Europe however lose 
considerably as a result of the loss of both skilled and unskilled labor, unlike the developing 
economies where some gains could be made. Another important difference with the developing 
economies is that the losses were less from the movement of skilled labor than from unskilled. 
This result reflects the relative abundance of skilled labor in these developed economies. 
Residents in North America and the Rest of Asia also lose, but to a lesser extent. The Pacific 
Islands gain only marginally from this policy, as a result of trade ties. 
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Table 11B  Welfare Results From Removal of Skilled Labor, Supplied by Developed Economies 
(Millions Of US$) 
 Host Region  













Australia 132.68 -0.68 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 132.12
New Zealand -2.56 14.71 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 12.21
Pacific Islands 0.95 0.46 0.57 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 1.96
China 1.69 0.21 0.00 -0.08 -0.28 0.03 -0.85 0.71
South Asia 0.71 0.05 0.00 -0.03 -0.32 0.00 -1.13 -0.73
N. America 37.08 6.45 0.01 -80.97 0.69 0.03 -0.02 -36.73
Europe 658.79 73.66 0.00 0.31 -1097.61 0.02 -0.06 -364.90
S. East Asia 1.62 -0.05 0.00 -0.06 -0.20 0.04 1.16 2.51
Rest of E. Asia 35.57 7.29 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -92.99 -0.01 -50.15
N. Africa & 
Middle East 0.41 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.56 0.00 -0.74 -0.90
E. Europe & 
Former Soviet 
Union -0.94 -0.07 0.00 0.02 0.27 0.02 -2.35 -3.04
ROW 0.87 -0.14 0.00 -0.27 -1.47 0.02 -3.11 -4.10
Total Welfare of 
Host Region 866.88 101.90 0.58 -81.13 -1099.35 -92.82 -7.12 -311.05
% of Labor Force 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.01 0.00 
5. Conclusion 
This paper provides further evidence of the potential gains to be made by both labor exporting 
and importing regions from negotiations under GATS Mode 4. Here we examine the impact on 
welfare, Real GDP and wages of Australia and New Zealand increasing their quotas on skilled an 
unskilled labor from the Pacific Islands economies by 1% of their labor force. The results show 
that Australia and New Zealand would gain considerably from increasing these quotas through 
GATS Mode 4. Although most of the negotiations have focussed on the mobility of skilled labor, 
this paper provides further evidence that the gains from North-South agreements under GATS 
Mode 4 are greatest when applied to unskilled labor. This result is consistent with other findings, 
such as Walmsley and Winters (2005).  
The paper also found that Australia’s and New Zealand’s choices of sending partners among 
developing economies do not affect the welfare gains accruing to them. The gains made by 
Australia and New Zealand were similar regardless of whether labor came from the Pacific 
Islands, South East Asia or a combination of developing economies. Of course the choice of 
sending region had a considerable impact on the welfare of the sending economies themselves. 
 24
The Pacific Island economies gained substantially from sending unskilled labor to Australia and 
New Zealand under GATS Mode 4. In the case of skilled labor, however, the loss of scarce 
skilled labor was shown to have a significant negative impact on the permanent residents 
remaining in the Pacific Islands and significantly increased the wages of the remaining skilled 
workers.  
However, when GATS Mode 4 is linked to capacity building efforts it was assumed that 80% of 
skilled and unskilled workers would return with increased productivities. Under this assumption, 
the results for the permanent residents remaining in the Pacific Islands were positive, albeit again 
most of the gains were from increases in the productivities of unskilled workers. Hence, while 
unskilled labor movements result in unambiguously positive gains, the impact of increased 
mobility of skilled labor is clearly negative and needs to be considered carefully. Remittances do 
not completely offset the loss of skilled workers in the Pacific Islands and nor do capacity 
building efforts aimed at increasing the productivities of returning migrants. However if skilled 
migration is an inevitable part of Pacific Island economies, then temporary schemes which 
incorporate capacity building efforts and encourage higher remittance rates are likely to go 
someway to mitigating the losses of skilled migration. 
Finally, this paper also examined the case where the quotas were met by an increase in labor from 
developed economies. In this case, the gains made by Australia and New Zealand were much 
greater than when labor was supplied by developing economies.  However Europe, North 
America and the rest of Asia, the three sending economies, all lost significantly as a result of the 
lost labor supply, particularly from the loss of unskilled labor.    
A FINAL WARNING! Analysis of the Pacific Island economies is always fraught with 
difficulties and this paper is no exception. The lack of country specific data on the rest of Oceania 
in the GTAP Data Base is a cause for concern.  Further work improving the availability of data in 
this region would improve this analysis considerably. 
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